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Abstract
In the context of climate protection policy it has been suggested that global CO2 emissions
should be reduced significantly (contraction) and that per capita emissions should gradually be
equalized across countries (convergence). This paper uses a dynamic multi-region computable
general equilibrium model of the world economy to assess the economics of “Contraction and
Convergence” (C&C). In comparing a regime of tradable and non-tradable emission rights for
implementing C&C we find that the former allows to reduce long-term costs of abatement in
terms of Hicksian equivalent variation in lifetime income by more than 50% percent in
comparison with the latter. Under a tradable permit regime some developing countries improve
their economic welfare even beyond non-abatement baseline levels. A decomposition of the
general equilibrium effects associated with C&C shows that changes in the terms of trade
constitute a key determinant of the overall welfare effects.
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11. Introduction
In order to mitigate the expected climate change arising from the atmospheric
accumulation of CO2 and other trace gases, a significant contraction of global greenhouse gas
emissions is widely postulated. These requests date back at least to the so-called Toronto
summit in 1988, in which reduction rates of up to 50 percent by the year 2050 have been
suggested. More recently, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated
that in order to avoid an increase of the global mean temperature by more than 2 degrees
Celsius by the end of the next century, global emissions will have to start declining soon; by
2050 they will have to be reduced by roughly 25 percent below current levels (Houghton et al.
1996).
In a similar vein, the Global Commons Institute has devised a greenhouse gas
abatement proposal called “Contraction and Convergence” (Global Commons Institute 1997),
in which the emphasis is placed not only on a significant contraction of anthropogenic CO2
emissions, but also on an equitable per capita distribution of the resulting global carbon budget.
The latter implies a transition to a point (convergence) where future entitlements to emit will
have become proportional to population. The uniform per capita allocation of emission rights
reflects egalitarianism in the sense that all people have inherently an equal right to pollute. The
egalitarian criterion per se has a strong philosophical appeal. However – under contraction of
the global carbon budget  – it is unlikely to be acceptable for industrialized countries with
currently high per capita emissions unless the transition path allows for long-term “smooth”
adjustment towards the terminal point.
Equity considerations are not only ethically founded; they also conform to the idea that
equity might “serve a positive role as a unifying principle that facilitates an international
greenhouse warming agreement” (Rose and Stevens, 1996 p.1). Many analysts of the issue
have concluded that greater cooperation is likely to be forthcoming if the cooperation
agreement is perceived to be fair (see, e.g. Morrisette and Plantinga 1991, Bohm and Larsen
1994).
The outcome of the Kyoto conference in December 1997 backs this proposition though
concepts of equity have remained rather vague during the negotiation process. Equity
considerations are nevertheless implicit to the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, the industrialized
(Annex B) countries have committed themselves to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
varying degrees, apparently meaning to reflect differences in the “ability to pay”. Equity can
2also be invoked to justify that developing countries have, as yet, not made any commitment to
greenhouse gas abatement.
The provisions of the Kyoto Protocol are of a relatively short-term nature (2008-2012).
The Kyoto emission limits for the industrialized countries will not prevent global carbon
emissions to grow significantly for reasonable baseline assumptions of economic development
and future fossil fuel consumption in developing countries. In view of the long-term reduction
requirements mentioned above further reduction obligations for industrialized countries and
some emission cap for developing countries will be necessary. Cooperation by developing
countries is likely only if they perceive their share in the global long-term carbon budget as fair.
On part of the developing world this comes effectively down to an equal per capita allocation
of emission rights (Rose and Stevens 1996).
Apart from explicit equity considerations the opportunities for coordinated abatement
policies play another major role in climate policy negotiations. To reduce costs of abatement
the Kyoto Protocol in principle allows for the use of flexible mechanisms such as joint
implementation (JI), clean development mechanisms (CDM) or emissions trading (ET). These
so-called Kyoto instruments exploit differences in marginal abatement costs across regions. On
the latest Conference of Parties at Buenos Aires (1998) increasing emphasis has been placed on
the use of globally tradable emission rights to ensure minimization of global abatement costs.1
Overall, it appears that the “Contraction and Convergence” paradigm (C&C), merged
with the idea of tradable permits, could serve as a unifying concept to operate climate
protection in the long run. A precursor of such an approach has been proposed by Welsch
(1993). In the current paper we use a dynamic multi-region computable general equilibrium
model of the world economy (Bernstein, Montgomery and Rutherford 1997, Böhringer and
Rutherford 1999a) to assess the economics of this proposal. Our most important conclusion is
that adoption of the "Contraction and Convergence" paradigm at the global level will be much
easier if emission rights are tradable. Restrictions to permit trade impose significantly higher
costs on the world economy. Moreover, a tradable permit regime allows some developing
countries to significantly improve their economic welfare beyond non-abatement baseline
levels. A decomposition of the general equilibrium effects shows that changes in the terms of
trade play an important role for explaining the overall welfare effects.
                                               
1 In fact, national parliaments of several Annex 1 countries - the so-called JUSCANZ countries or UMBRELLA
group - have put acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol under condition that international emissions trading can be
used as a flexible mechanism to meet national reduction targets.
3In section 2 we explain how the C&C formula is operated to derive the emission
budgets of regions along the timepath; we also sketch the abatement policies to be analyzed in
the current paper. In section 3 we describe the basic features and the parameterization of our
modeling framework. In section 4 we present results, and in section 5 we offer policy
conclusions.
2. Operating “Contraction and Convergence”
A. Permit Allocation Formula
With respect to “Contraction” we assume that global carbon emissions are to be
reduced by 25 percent in 2050 relative to 1990. In accordance with “Convergence”, it is
postulated that each person in the world should have an equal share in the resulting stock of
carbon emission rights in 2050. The emission quotas for the period before 2050 should reflect
differences in present per capita emissions, in order to facilitate smooth adjustment in high-
emission countries.
More specifically, assume that the allotment of long-term carbon rights comes into
force by the year 2000. Let t= 1, 2, ... , 50 refer to the years 2001, 2002, ..., 2050. Then the
per capita emission rights of country i in year t, zi(t), should be a weighted average of per
capita emissions in 2000 and the uniform per capita right valid in 2050:
ztzttz ii ×+×
-=
50
)2000(
50
50)( ,
where:  zi(2000) = per capita emissions in 2000 in country i,
z  = uniform per capita emission right in 2050.
The total carbon limit CARBLIMi(t) for a country in a certain year is obtained by
multiplying the per capita emission right by the country’s population POPi(t) in that year:
)()()( tPOPtztCARBLIM iii ×=
Of course, in implementing this formula, it is important to use population projections
fixed ex ante, in order to avoid incentives for population growth. Adding the carbon limits
across countries defines the global carbon limit.
4This procedure gives a gradual adjustment in both total emissions and in the
distribution of emission rights across countries, in line with the contraction and convergence
paradigm.
B. Abatement Policies
In our simulations (see section 4 below) we distinguish between two abatement regimes
which capture the extreme points of non-cooperative and cooperative carbon abatement
policy:
NTR: The carbon limits CARBLIM strictly apply at the country level. In other words,
countries are not allowed to buy or sell emission permits on international markets. All
emission reductions must take place domestically.
TRD: Emission rights can be traded across borders. There are no restrictions to the eligibility
of trading partners and the magnitude of emission trade.
Throughout the simulations we treat emission limitations as a resource constraint. We
then can interpret the shadow price on the emission constraint, i.e. the marginal abatement
costs, as the carbon tax rate or likewise the price of the non-tradable / tradable emission rights.
In the TRD case there will be an equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries.
Revenues from carbon taxes or permits enter the national accounts in each region.
3.  Model Characteristics and Parameterization
A. Model Characteristics
The current model features 10 regions (countries) which are linked through bilateral
trade flows.  The economic structure of each region consists of  4 production sectors (1 non-
energy sector and 3 fossil fuel sectors) whose outputs are demanded by intermediate
production, exports, investment and a representative consumer. Table 1 gives an overview of
the regional and sectoral aggregation, which is based on GTAP data for 30 regions and 38
sectors (McDougall, 1995). Producers and representative consumers behave according to the
competitive paradigm, in the sense that they take market prices as given. Consumption and
investment decisions are based on rational point expectations of  future prices. The
representative agent for each region maximizes lifetime utility from consumption which
implicitly determines the level of savings. Entrepreneurs choose investment in order to
5maximize the present value of their firms. We provide a non-technical description of the
intertemporal multi-sector, multi-region model.2
Table 1: Overview of sectors and countries/regions (data base: GTAP 3.0; see McDougall,
1995)
Sectors Regions
Label Long name Label Long name
COL Coal NAM North America (USA and Canada)
GAS Natural gas WEU Western Europe
OIL Crude oil PAO Pacific OECD (Japan, Australia, New Zealand)
MACRO Non-energy macro good aggregate REC Reforming economy countries (newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union, Central and
Eastern Europe)
LAM Latin America and the Caribbean
MEA Middle East and North Africa
AFR Sub-Saharan Africa
CHN China and Hong Kong
PAS Other Pacific Asia
IDI India
Production
In each region production of the non-energy macro good is captured by an aggregate
production function which characterizes technology through transformation possibilities on the
output side (between production for domestic and export markets) and substitution
possibilities on the input side (between alternative combinations of inputs). On the output side
production is split between goods produced for the domestic markets and goods produced for
the export market subject to a constant elasticity of transformation. On the input side capital,
labor and an energy aggregate of fossil fuels trade off with a constant elasticity of substitution.
Production of the energy aggregate is described by a CES function which reflects substitution
possibilities for different fossil fuels (i.e., coal, gas, and oil). Fossil fuels are produced from
fuel-specific resources and the non-energy macro good subject to a CES technology. The
elasticity of substitution between the resource input and non-energy inputs is calibrated to
match a given price elasticity of supply. Depletion leads to rising fossil fuel prices at constant
demand quantities, but the relationship between depletion rates, fossil energy stocks and fuel
production is not incorporated (i.e. the model has no stock accounting of fossil fuels).
                                               
2 An algebraic model summary can be obtained from the authors on request.
6Household Behavior
In each region a representative household chooses to allocate lifetime income across
consumption in different time periods in order to maximize lifetime utility. In each period
households face the choice between current consumption and future consumption, which can
be purchased via savings. That is, consumption and the level of savings are endogenously
determined in each period. The trade-off between current consumption and savings is given by
a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Households demand an aggregate
consumption good, which is a CES composite of the non-energy macro good and a household-
specific energy aggregate.
 Investment
Managers of  the firms invest as long as the marginal return on investment equals the
marginal cost of capital formation. The rates of return are determined by a uniform and
endogenous world interest rate such that the marginal productivity of a unit of investment and
a unit of consumption is equalized within and across countries.
International Trade
Following Armington (1969), domestic, imported and exported varieties of the non-
energy goods are distinguished by origin. The Armington aggregation function provides a
constant elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties for the non-energy
good for all buyers in the domestic market. With respect to trade in energy, fossil fuels from
different regions are treated as perfect substitutes, which implies that we use net trade data
with no cross-hauling. International capital flows reflect borrowing and lending at the world
interest rate, and are endogenous subject to an intertemporal balance of payments constraint:
there is no change in net indebtedness over the entire model horizon, i.e., net-indebtedness is
the same at the initial and at the terminal point.
Backstop Technologies
In each region there are backstop technologies for producing the industrial energy
aggregate or the household energy aggregate. The backstop technology defines the price for a
carbon free energy source (e.g. photovoltaic, fuel cells) and hence implicitly determines an
upper limit on the marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions.3
                                               
3 In the baseline parametrization the cost of the backstop fuel is six times the price of the region’s
(industrial/household) energy composite for the baseyear 1992.
7B. Parameterization
Benchmark data are used to calibrate parameters of the functional forms from a given
set of quantities, prices and elasticities. Data from four different sources are combined to yield
a consistent benchmark data set:
· GTAP database (McDougall, 1995). GTAP includes detailed input-output tables for 37
sectors in 30 regions and  a world trade matrix with bilateral trade flows for all sectors and
regions.
· IEA energy balances and energy prices/taxes (IEA, 1994). IEA provides statistics on
physical energy flows and energy prices  for industrial and household demands.
· WEC/IIASA (IIASA, 1998). WEC/IIASA makes projections on the future development of
world GDP and fossil fuel production for the 21st century differentiated by countries.
· Bank for International Reconstruction and Development (Bos et al. 1992). This source
provides data on population growth till 2050 for 194 countries plus summary groups.
We replace GTAP's aggregate input-output monetary values for energy supply and
demand with physical energy flows and energy prices as given in IEA's energy statistics. This
"bottom-up" calibration of energy demands and supplies yields sector-specific and energy-
specific CO2 coefficients. The advantage is that marginal abatement cost curves and hence the
cost evaluation of emission constraints are based on actual energy flows rather than aggregate
monetary data, which strengthens the credibility of the quantitative results.
Dynamic models in applied CGE analysis are often calibrated to a steady-state growth
path in which all physical quantities grow at exogenous rates.4 In our analysis we incorporate
the exogenous WEC/IIASA assumptions on non-uniform growth rates for GDP and fossil fuel
production across countries.5 The exogenous assumptions on fossil fuel production for our
business as usual (BAU) scenario imply a reference emission level for the world as a whole. At
the country level the BAU emission trajectory determines the extent  to which potential
reduction obligations with respect to a reference year (in our case: 1990) bind in the future.6
                                               
4 The virtue of the steady-state calibration is that the amount of exogenous information which goes beyond the
explanatory scope of the model is kept at a minimum.
5 See Böhringer, Jensen and Rutherford (1999) for calibration routines to match GDP forecasts with energy
production projections.
6 See Böhringer, Jensen and Rutherford (1999) on the importance of baseline assumptions for the magnitude
and distribution of abatement costs.
8Population projections determine the carbon budget trajectory CARBLIM for each
region according to our permit allocation formula (given a 25 % cutback of global carbon
emissions in 2050 as compared to 1990 world emission levels).
Table 2 summarizes the central values for  key elasticities employed for the core
simulations.
Table 2: Overview of key elasticities
Type of elasticity Description Central Value
Armington elasticity of substitution Degree of substitutability
· between macro imports from different
regions
· between the import aggregate and the
domestically produced macro good
2
1
Armington elasticity of transformation Degree of substitutability between macro
good produced for the domestic market and
macro good destined for the export market
2
Price elasticity of fossil fuel supply Degree of  response of international fossil
fuel  supply to changes in fossil fuel price
1 (coal), 4 (gas), 8
(oil)
Elasticity of substitution between non-
energy and energy composite in
production and final demand
This value increases linearly over time
between a short-run value and the long-run
value to reflect empirical evidence on
differences between short-run and long-run
adjustment costs (Lindbeck, 1983)
0.2 (short run: 2000)
1.0 (long run: 2050)
Interfuel elasticity of substitution Degree of substitutability between fossil
fuels (fuel switching)
0.5 (final demand)
2a,1b (industry)
a between oil and gas,  bbetween coal and the oil-gas aggregate
4. Results
A. Emissions and Marginal Abatement Costs
The overall carbon limit in 2050 together with the population projections implies a
reduction of world per-capita emissions from 1.065 tons of carbon in 2000 to 0.48 tons in
2050. Table 3 summarizes the per capita endowment with carbon emission rights across
regions emerging from the C&C-formula.
By definition of our C&C-formula the terminal value in 2050 is identical for all regions.
The initial value, however shows a tremendous dispersion, ranging from 0.21 tons for AFR to
5.2 tons for NAM. This dispersion reflects the current “inequities” in per capita emissions
between the industrialized regions and developing countries. It should be noted however that
except for AFR and IDI all regions have to cut back their emissions per capita (of course, by
varying degrees) relative to current levels.
9Table 3: Per capita emission endowments by region (in tons of carbon per capita)
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
CHN 0.72 0.67 0.62 0.58 0.53 0.48
REC 1.83 1.56 1.29 1.02 0.75 0.48
IDI 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.48
MEA 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.48
NAM 5.23 4.28 3.33 2.38 1.43 0.48
WEU 2.75 2.29 1.84 1.39 0.93 0.48
PAO 2.87 2.39 1.91 1.44 0.96 0.48
LAM 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.48
AFR 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.48
PAS 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.48
WORLD 1.07 0.91 0.77 0.66 0.56 0.48
Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the carbon trajectories under BAU, NTR and TRD
together with the mandated timepath of emission rights CARBLIM which comes from our
C&C-formula. Under BAU, global emissions increase from 6 Gt carbon in 2000 to roughly
11.5 Gt carbon in 2050 (see Figure 1). This BAU trajectory is in line with the IIASA-WEC
scenario B (middle course). By 2050 the administered global carbon limit of 4.4 Gt is more
than 60 % below BAU emissions which indicates the need for substantial adjustment towards
less carbon-intensive production and consumption patterns. At the global level, strictly
domestic abatement action (NTR) involves less carbon emissions than free trade in permit
rights (TRD). The reason is that regions IDI, AFR and MEA do not face a binding carbon
constraint, i.e. they do not use their emission rights to the full extent possible. As Figures 2g,
2h and 2j show, these regions have a substantial increase of emissions under NTR as compared
to BAU. This is a phenomenon related to a shift in comparative advantage, as will be explained
below.
When emission rights get tradable IDI, MEA and AFR use their carbon budget to the
full extent possible which leads to an effective increase in global carbon emissions of roughly
10 % by 2050 as compared to the NTR case. This phenomena has been referred to as hot air
(Herold 1998, Greenpeace 1998).
The magnitude of the marginal abatement cost in the NTR case depends crucially on the
extent to which the carbon emission constraint binds the respective economies. The effective
reduction requirement for the different regions at any point over time is given by the distance
between BAU and CARBLIM. The higher the effective cut-back, the higher are – ceteris
paribus – the carbon taxes necessary to meet the emission constraint.
10
Figure 1: Global carbon emission trajectories
Figure 2a-j: Emission profiles at country level
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Fig. 2a : Emissions in Country NAM
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Fig. 2b : Emissions in Country WEU
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Fig. 2c : Emissions in Country PAO
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Fig. 2d : Emissions in Country REC
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Figure 2a-2j: Emission profiles at country level
Fig. 2e : Emissions in Country LAM
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Fig. 2g : Emissions in Country AFR
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Fig. 2i : Emissions in Country PAS
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Fig. 2h : Emissions in Country CHN
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Fig. 2j : Emissions in Country IDI
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Fig. 2f : Emissions in Country MEA
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Figures 3 and 4 show the carbon tax trajectories for the NTR case. In addition we have
plotted the price trajectory of tradable permits (WORLD) as a reference line to explain the
pattern of permit trade emerging from the countries' before trade situation.
There are no carbon taxes under NTR for regions IDI, AFR and MEA. This is simply
because C&C does not bind economic growth in these regions. In all other countries C&C
constrains economic development more and more over time inducing a continuous increase in
marginal abatement costs. In other words, as cheap mitigation options are exhausted over time
it gets more and more costly at the margin to substitute away from carbon.
OECD regions (NAM, WEU, PAO) and REC face the highest effective abatement
requirements under the C&C proposal and therefore need very high carbon taxes to restrict
drastically their carbon use in the long run. On the other hand there are regions LAM, CHN
and PAS for which C&C imposes less stringent abatement requirements which translates into
relatively lower carbon tax rates.
Comparing regional tax rates in the NTR case, which range from 0 to more than 1500
$US, there is considerable potential for carbon trading, i.e. global equalization of marginal
abatement costs. Countries whose marginal abatement costs under NTR are below the global
carbon tax (TRD) will sell permits and abate more emissions. In turn, countries whose
marginal abatement costs are above the global tax rate will buy permits and abate less
emissions.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 indicate that NAM, WEU, PAO and REC7 buy permit rights
whereas IDI8, AFR, MEA, CHN, LAM and PAS sell emission rights.
Emissions trading implies that the group of permit buyers reduce their emissions
between 2000 and 2050 by only 70 % of what they would have to in the NTR case. CHN,
LMA and PAS abate about 1.3 times as much as they would under NTR. IDI, AFR and MEA
do not undertake any abatement in the NTR case; under the TRD regime they do abate roughly
30 percent of their aggregate BAU emissions between 2000 and 2050.
                                               
7 In the first decade there is some limited scope in REC for selling emission rights due to low growth
projections. After 2010 actual growth projections for this region imply a net buyer position.
8 In an intertemporal perspective IDI is an important seller of emission rights. Note however that IDI buys
carbon rights under TRD at the very beginning of C&C. The increase in lifetime income due to carbon trade is
used in part for an increase in consumption during the intitial period. The induced increase in production
requires additional purchases of carbon rights – otherwise domestic production would be constrainted by the
small initial emission budget of C&C.
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Figure 3: Carbon taxes under NTR below global TRD permit price (WORLD)
seller countries. N.B.: IDI, MEA and AFR without any carbon taxes
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Figure 4: Carbon taxes under NTR above global TRD permit price (WORLD)
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B. Welfare Effects
The effect of C&C on gross economic welfare9 could be measured as the change in real
consumption. On a worldwide scale we find that the limitation of carbon emissions over time
leads to a decrease in real consumption relative to BAU. This reflects the fact that the
restriction of the global carbon emission resource induces significant costs of adjustment
towards less carbon-intensive production and consumption. The decrease in consumption is
substantially less pronounced in the TRD case than in the NTR case. To illustrate this in
quantitative terms: By 2050, the loss amounts to 2.3 percent under TRD and to 5.1 percent
under NTR.
Figure 5: World Consumption trajectory – TRD versus NTR (percentage change from BAU)
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In general, comparison of  the trajectories of real consumption does not provide a
straightforward welfare measure. When trajectories cross - which in our simulations is the case
for all buyers of carbon emission rights (as well as the world in total) - the visual comparison
does even not allow for an ordinal ranking of alternative policies but needs to be supplemented
by discounting consumption to a given reference point in time. We therefore use an aggregate
intertemporal welfare measure which is the Hicksian equivalent variation with respect to
lifetime income.
                                               
9 Our welfare evaluation is restricted to a cost-efficiency analysis, i.e. we neglect the benefits from an increase
in environmental quality (abatement of global warming).
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Considering the percentage Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in lifetime income as
depicted in Table 4, we find that – for our C&C abatement scenario and model
parameterization - carbon trading is universally beneficial.
Table 4: HEV in lifetime income (% change from BAU ) – NTR versus TRD
NTR TRD
CHN -3.02 -1.08
REC -9.76 -8.82
IDI 0.25 17.28
MEA -3.07 2.56
NAM -3.20 -2.68
WEU -1.72 -1.40
PAO -1.46 -1.21
LAM -1.13 0.38
AFR -2.07 17.04
PAS -0.15 0.16
WORLD -2.26 -0.99
Most outstanding are the substantial gains from trade in carbon rights for regions IDI
and AFR. In fact, these regions do not only benefit dramatically from trade as compared to the
NTR case but improve their economic welfare much beyond BAU levels. The same applies –
though to a much smaller extent – to regions MEA, LAM and PAS. Regions which are still
quite adversely affected by C&C under TRD include the OECD regions (NAM, WEU and
PAO) and the reforming economy countries (REC) as well as China (CHN). All regions with
exception of IDI experience a net welfare loss from C&C in the no trade case. The welfare
implications for IDI, MEA and AFR under NTR emphasize the importance of international
spill-overs. In other words: Though these regions do not have to undertake domestic
abatement they nevertheless are affected by abatement action in other countries through
international markets, i. e. changes in international prices (the terms of trade).10 Before we
explain the economic implications at the regional level let us briefly summarize the key factors
that will determine the welfare impacts of C&C:
                                               
10 Terms of trade can be used to determine whether a country will benefit or lose from the change in
international prices. Terms of trade are measured as the ratio in value terms of a country’s imports to its
exports. A positive change in the terms of trade then means that the country has to export less for a given
amount of imports, i.e. the country experiences a welfare gain from the change in international prices.
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· A country’s cost to abate carbon emissions depend critically on its baseline economic
development. The latter determines baseline emission growth which in turn implies the
effective cut-back requirement with respect to an exogenous emission target profile (in
our case: CARBLIM). Greater required reduction in carbon emissions as a percentage
of baseline emissions leads to larger abatement costs.
· As to spill-over effects from international markets the trade patterns of a region
significantly determines the extent to which this region will gain or lose from changes in
international prices. With respect to carbon abatement and our sectoral disaggregation
it is useful to distinguish spill-overs from two major international markets:
- fossil fuel markets: A larger cutback in global fossil fuel consumption depresses the
international prices of fossil fuel (the magnitude of depression depends to a large
extent on the underlying supply elasticities). In this respect a region which imports
fossil fuels will benefit from the contraction of world fuel consumption whereas a
country which exports fossil fuels will suffer.11
- non-energy markets: Due to product heterogeneity associated with the Armington
assumption for non-energy macro good trade, countries are able to pass on an
increase in production prices to other countries. Whether a country will experience
a terms of trade loss or gain on the macro good markets depends on its initial trade
shares and elasticities (of export supply and import demand) as well as differences
in the costs of producing the macro good induced by C&C. The price differentials
for Armington goods of the same variety across regions determine the substitution
effects in international trade, that is whether a country will rather lose or win export
markets.
While at the global level terms of trade effects should net out to zero it is clear that at
the single country/region level the welfare implications will have opposite directions.12 Terms
of trade effects are the reason why – in a general equilibrium framework - trade in permits need
not necessarily be beneficial for all countries.13
                                               
11 If a region at the same time is a net exporter of some fuel and a net importer of some other fuel the aggregate
fossil fuel market effect is ambiguous.
12 The gains for one country translate into symmetric losses for other countries.
13 Though a specific country in the first place will benefit from carbon trade there are secondary terms of trade
effects which could offset (or enhance) the primary benefits.
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To explain the gross welfare implications associated with carbon emission constraints in
open economies we employ the decomposition method as described in Böhringer and
Rutherford (1999b). This decomposition allows for a break down of the aggregate economic
effect into a domestic policy effect (i. e., domestic adjustment abstracting from changes in
international prices) and international spill-overs (i. e., changes in the terms of trade). Table 5
summarizes the outcome of the decomposition for the NTR case.
Table 5: Decomposition of HEV in lifetime income under NTR (in % from BAU)
A B C D
IDI 0.00 1.70 0.25 0.25
CHN -2.07 -1.38 -0.95 -3.02
MEA 0.00 -3.19 -3.07 -3.07
NAM -3.10 -0.11 -0.11 -3.20
WEU -1.80 0.11 0.08 -1.72
PAO -1.49 0.02 0.03 -1.46
REC -9.30 -0.73 -0.46 -9.76
LAM -0.06 -0.57 -1.06 -1.13
AFR 0.00 -1.41 -2.07 -2.07
PAS -0.36 0.33 0.22 -0.15
A: Domestic policy effect of abatement keeping international prices at the BAU level
B: Fossil Fuel Price Effect: Welfare effect when we account for changes in international fuel
prices but keep the price of the macro good at the BAU level
C: Isolated terms of trade effect (D - C)
D: Full carbon abatement effect (A + C) – see column NTR of Table 4
The domestic policy effect (column A of Table 5) reports the welfare impacts of carbon
constraints assuming that international prices are unaffected from the domestic (tax) abatement
policy. As expected for an initial situation without distorting taxes, the welfare impact of
domestic emission abatement is negative. Emission limits require a reduction in fossil fuel
consumption which causes domestic industries to substitute towards less emission-intensive,
more costly manufacturing and production techniques. In addition, fuel for final consumption
becomes more expensive. The rise in the real consumption price index implies a loss in real
income (welfare) for households. The magnitude of the inframarginal welfare loss associated
with the domestic abatement policy depends on a number of  factors such as the effective
reduction requirement with respect to the baseline, the initial energy (emission) intensity,
substitution elasticities, etc. By definition, the domestic policy effect is zero for regions IDI,
AFR and MEA which do not have to undertake any carbon abatement.
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As outlined above an important determinant for the sign and magnitude of the
aggregate terms-of-trade effects are changes in international fossil fuel prices togehter with the
region’s initial fossil fuel trade position. The welfare implications of spill-overs from
international fossil fuel markets at the single region level are reported in column B of Table 5.
We see that IDI, WEU, PAO and PAS experience welfare gains from changes in international
fuel prices whereas CHN, MEA, NAM, REC, LAM and AFR face welfare losses. Not
surprisingly MEA as a major exporter of oil suffers most from the fall in fossil fuel prices.14
CHN – an important future coal exporter – and REC which - supplies large quantities of gas to
world markets - are also affected negatively from the price decrease on international fossil fuel
markets.
Column C of Table 5 reports the welfare implications of total terms of trade changes
across regions. Jointly with column B we see that price changes on the international markets
for the non-energy macro good impose major welfare losses for regions IDI, AFR and LAM
whereas CHN, MEA and REC can partially offset the negative welfare impacts due to the fall
in fuel prices. As a consequence of their macro good trade relations with high carbon tax
countries (NAM, PAO or WEU) IDI, AFR and LAM turn to net tax burden importers rather
than net tax burden exporters. The opposite applies for regions CHN, MEA and REC.
The transition from the NTR regime to the TRD regime significantly changes the
magnitude and distribution of costs associated with C&C. First of all, trade of permits – in our
scenario – constitutes a win-win strategy such that prospects for multilateral cooperation are
enhanced. Permit trade turns out to be most beneficial for those regions which do not exploit
their carbon budget to the full extent under NTR. For these regions the price of emission rights
increases dramatically from zero to the world market permit price under TRD. Their abundant
costless emission rights under NTR become a valuable international resource which provides
them with substantial addition net income.
As to the sign of welfare changes it is remarkable that trade in permits provides
sufficient efficiency gains for MEA, AFR, PAS and LAM to turn from a net loser position into
a net winner situation as compared to their baseline economic development. The OECD club
and CHN will still face economic losses from C&C but for CHN this loss drops dramatically.
By far worst affected from C&C under both NTR and TRD are the reforming economic
countries (REC). We can see from column A of Table 5 that the main reason for the welfare
                                               
14 Likewise oil exporting AFR and LAM face a substantial decline in export revenues from oil sales.
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losses is the costly adjustment of highly energy-intensive production and consumption towards
a significantly less emission-intensive economic structure.
5. Summary and Policy Implications
In this paper we have used a dynamic multi-region general equilibrium model of the
world economy to assess the economics of a scenario which entails contraction of carbon
emissions joint with convergence towards equal per capita emission rights over the time
horizon 2000 through 2050. Our C&C scenario implies that global emissions have to drop
from more than 11 Gt of carbon in 2050 in the baseline to just 4.4 Gt under C&C.
At the global level the associated economic costs in terms of Hicksian equivalent
variation in lifetime income range from –0.99 percent under tradable permits to –2.26 percent
under non-tradable emission right. The magnitude of efficiency gains from trade reflects the
tremendous range in marginal abatement costs across the different regions [between zero and
1500 $US (in 2050)].
At the regional level the abatement requirements associated with C&C differ quite a lot.
The OECD countries, CHN and REC will have to reduce their emissions substantially and will
incur significant economic losses. By contrast, there will be no abatement requirements for IDI,
AFR and MEA under NTR. Nevertheless, they will be adversely affected by C&C in the NTR
case. This makes quite transparent how important spill-over effects from international markets
(i.e. terms of trade effects) are for the aggregate welfare implications of C&C. IDI is the only
region which can improve economic welfare under NTR as compared to BAU because the
depreciation of international fuel prices in conjunction with their large endowment in carbon
rights provides them with a substantial competitive edge in producing more energy-intensive
goods. Disregarding the latter case, we conclude that it will be difficult to implement C&C
under the NTR regime as it can not be expected that major developing regions are willing to
bear a larger share of the abatement costs.
Trade in permits improves the economic well-being of all regions as compared to a
NTR regime. Thus, politically, it will be much easier to achieve an agreement to C&C when the
carbon permit regime allows for “where”-flexibility in abatement (trade). Major opponents to
carbon restrictions from the developing world such as AFR, LAM, MEA or IDI could be able
to improve their economic welfare even over BAU levels. To put it differently, C&C under
TRD works as an implicit transfer of economic resources from the developed world to the
developing world while assuring that also the developed world benefits from carbon trade as
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compared to the NTR scenario. CHN still suffers a welfare loss under TRD but this loss is
dramatically lower than under NTR such that political resistance towards C&C might be
expected to be also substantially lower. REC is the principal loser of C&C both under TRD and
NTR which results from their initially high emission-intensive production and consumption
structure. Our results indicate a need to think about a compensation mechanism for the
reforming economy countries (REC) in order to reduce their adjustment costs. Again, the
prospects to reach agreement on compensation for REC under C&C will be much higher if
financial transfers can be paid by the potential efficiency gains arising from a global tradable
permit system.
References
Armington, P.S. (1969), A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production, IMF Staff
Papers 16, 159-178.
Bernstein, P.M., Montgomery, W.D. and T.F. Rutherford (1997), World Economic Impacts of US
Commitments to Medium Term Carbon Emissions Limits, Final Report to the American Petroleum
Institute: Charles River Associates, Report No. 837-06.
Böhringer, C. and T.F.Rutherford (1999a), World Economic Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, in Welfens, P.J.J,
Hillebrand, R. and A. Ulph (Eds.): Internalization of the Economy, Environmental Problems and New
Policy Options, Springer, Heidelberg/New York, forthcoming: 1999.
Böhringer, C. and T.F. Rutherford (1999b), Decomposing General Equilibrium Effects of Policy Intervention
into Open Economies, ZEW working paper, Mannheim.
Böhringer, C., Jensen, J. and  T. F. Rutherford (1999), Energy Market Projections and Differentiated Carbon
Abatement in the European Union, ZEW discussion paper  No. 99-11, Mannheim.
Bohm, P. and B. Larsen (1994), Fairness in a Tradable Permit Treaty for Carbon Emissions Reductions in
Europe and the former Soviet Union, Environmental and Resource Economics 4, 219-239.
Bos, E. et al. (1992): World Population Projections 1992-1993 Edition, Washington: Bank for International
Reconstruction and Development 1992.
Global Commons Institute (1997), Contraction and Convergence: A Global Solution to a Global Problem,
http://www.gn.apc.org/gci/contconv/cc.html, updated 18/07/97.
Greenpeace (1998), UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, meeting of subsidiary bodies, position
paper, 2-12 June, Bonn.
Grubb, M. (1989), The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London.
Herold, A. (1998), Hot Air and the Kyoto Protocol. In: WWF/ Forum on Environment&Development (Eds.).:
Emissions Trading in International Climate Protection, proceedings, Bonn, 50-53.
21
Houghton, J.J. et al. (eds.) (1996), Climate Change 1995 – The Science of Climate Change, Cambridge
University Press.
IEA (1994), International Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Taxes / Energy Balances of OECD and Non-
OECD Countries, Paris: IEA publications.
IIASA (1998), IIASA/WEC Global Energy Perspectives,  http://www.iiasa.ac.at
Lindbeck, A. (1983), The Recent Slowdown of Productivity Growth, Economic Journal, 1983.
McDougall, R.A. (1995), The GTAP 3 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
Morrisette, P. and A. Plantinga (1991), The Global Warming Issue: Viewpoints of Different Countries,
Resources 103, 2-6.
Rose, A. and B. Stevens (1996), Equity Aspects of the Marektable Permits Approach to Global Warming
Policy, Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference of the European Association of
Environmental and Resource Economics, June 1996, Lisbon, Portugal.
Welsch, H. (1993), A CO2 Agreement Proposal with Flexible Quotas, Energy Policy 21, 748-756.
